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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that economic-geographical analyses of the recent financial crisis 
might learn from more than three decades of feminist scholarship on economic 
development. Feminist scholarship contributes (i) to the ongoing project of rethinking 
how economic geography is conceived and practiced; (ii) provides some analytical 
resources to inform the production of more complex, less partial geographies of 
financialisation and financial crises; (iii) is defined by its strong political and ethical 
commitments and can contribute to an economic geography better able to understand 
and form critical responses to the recent crisis. 
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‘I routinely characterise the credit crunch as "men behaving badly" - because it's 
almost impossible to find a woman to blame’ (Peston 2009:1). 
 
‘Markets cannot function effectively outside the framework of families and 
communities built on values of love, obligation, and reciprocity’ (Folbre, 2001: 
vii). 
 
A Introduction 
In the wake of what the United Nations General Assembly described as ‘the worst 
financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression’i there has been an outpouring 
of commentary on the causes of the crisis and its likely long term repercussions.  The 
magnitude of financial (let alone other) losses is still becoming clear and the figures 
quoted for taxpayer bailouts are ‘breathtaking’, to quote Mervyn King, head of the UK’s 
Bank of England (King and Gilmore, 2009; see also Blankenburg and Palma, 2009). In 
the UK alone, government bailouts, cash injections and other guarantees for the banks 
have reached £1.162 trillion (Morse 2011).   
One of the notable elements of the crisis has been the role accorded to particular 
masculinities. While the City of London has long been associated with the ‘gentlemanly 
capitalist’ (Cain and Hopkins, 2003) or the ‘sober, rational and powerful’ merchant 
banker (McDowell, 1997: 182), the sub-prime crisis has been populated by ‘men 
behaving badly’ (Peston 2009), ‘These F@#king guys’ (French and Leyshon 2010) and 
‘fanatical warriors in Armani suits’ (Sherman, 2009). Moreover, researchers in neuro-
economics are now arguing that physiology – and not just rationality – has a part to play 
in understanding the peaks and troughs of ‘testosterone capitalism’ (McDowell, 2010; 
Coates, 2009; Coates and Herbert, 2008). These readings are suggestive of some 
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important gendered dimensions of the crisis. Yet in various ways such readings can 
obfuscate if, 
“the crisis is located in the idea of different kinds of masculinity failing, rather 
than in the need to re-examine the pillars of technical financial knowledge” 
(Marshall 2009:422).  
In this paper, I argue that we have not only witnessed a very geographical crisis 
(French et al., 2009) but also one that is profoundly gendered. In what follows I 
consider how economic-geographical analyses of the recent crisis might learn from 
more than three decades of feminist scholarship
ii
 on economic development that has 
long grappled with the gendered dynamics and repercussions of financial crises.  This 
analytical revisiting, I argue, can help us interrogate the pillars of ‘technical financial 
knowledge’ and is important for (at least) three reasons.  
First, as Martin argues (2010:28), the crisis provokes questions not only about 
what happened, but also ‘the theoretical and empirical scope of economic geography 
itself’. At stake here is not just how economic geographers (and others) theorise 
financialization
iii
 and financial crises, but also a broader project of rethinking how 
economic geography is conceived and practised (Gibson-Graham, 1996; Lee et al., 
2008; Martin and Sunley, 2001; Murphy, 2008; Pollard et al., 2009; Vira and James, 
2011). The crisis is an opportunity for economic geographers to take stock of what and 
how they might learn from not one, but two of their ‘others’; feminist research on 
previous financial crises exposes economic geographers not only to gender analysis but 
is also often more oriented to research in parts of the South, ‘the feminized other to 
advanced economies’ (Nagar et al., 2002: 265). Thus some of the feminist analyses 
drawn upon in the paper, informed by postcolonial sensibilities, talk back to western 
theories – economic and feminist alike – questioning the politics and relevance of 
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frameworks centred on the experiences of the global North (hooks, 1984; Mohanty 
1988; 2003).  
Second, feminist literatures provide some analytical resources for economic 
geographers interested in producing more complex, less ‘anaemic’ (Christophers 2012) 
geographies of financialization (Pike and Pollard 2010, French et al. 2011). The recent 
crisis has pushed finance and financial crises further up the analytical agenda in 
economic geography and Martin (2010), for example, has documented some of the 
geographies of the US sub-prime housing bubble and subsequent crash, and the 
geographies of ensuing employment loss in finance, manufacturing and construction in 
the US and UK.  Feminist scholarship provides some guidance on how such analyses 
can be extended and, more broadly, encourages less partial economic-geographical 
understandings of financialization.  
Third, although the severity of the crisis opened a window of opportunity for 
ideological debate, the left has struggled to find its voice(s), to challenge the 
‘distributive coalition’ (Froud et al., 2010) that protects financial elites, or to re-
introduce more democratic oversight of financial markets (French and Leyshon, 2010; 
Castree, 2010). As Christophers (2009) argues, geographers should be well placed to 
disrupt the discourses of complexity about contemporary finance that veil its politics.  
On this score, it is instructive to revisit feminist scholarship that, for all its diversity, has 
been defined by its strong political and ethical commitments (Wright, 2008), and has 
long articulated the need for a more humane economics and been at the forefront of 
debates about provisioning, needs, sustainability and redistribution.   
The paper is structured as follows. The first part sets the scene by outlining the 
shifting geopolitical context of the recent crisis that makes it instructive to learn some 
lessons from previous crises. The rest of the paper constructs a two-stage argument. 
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Section II revisits more than three decades of diverse feminist scholarship that has 
demonstrated that economic theory is gendered (and western-centric) in its assumptions, 
models and practices (Ferber and Nelson 2003, Zein-Elabdin and Charusheela 2004). 
This scholarship may be very familiar in some quarters but some of its key tenets bear 
re-stating for economic geographers concerned with the recent crisis. Section III moves 
beyond these more familiar lessons of feminist scholarship to outline an agenda for 
research based on extending the sites and agents considered in financial-geographical 
enquiry. 
 
AI Shifting geographies of financial crises 
In this section I argue that economic geographers can ‘head south’ (Vira and James 
2011) and learn from scholarship that has long been grappling with the fall out of 
neoliberalism and financial crises. This manoeuvre is not designed to universalise or 
over-generalise from the experiences of parts of the global South, but rather to highlight 
feminist research that has long linked the macroeconomic context of economic change 
with the micro-politics of context and struggle (see Mohanty 2003). This is also 
important in the context of the shifting geo-economic and geo-political terrain of the 
twenty first century. Although, many features of the recent financial crisis resonate with 
earlier crises, what makes this latest one different - and of much greater analytical and 
political interest for many economic geographers working in the North - is the 
geography of its gestation and ensuing chaos.  
A significant marker signalling the onset of a new round of financialization in 
parts of the North was the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in the early 1970s 
which had the effect of replacing the gold:dollar relationship with a system of floating 
exchange rates. The demise of Bretton Woods and its Keynesian, nation-state-centric 
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capital controls gave way to a widespread bout of neoliberal deregulation that removed 
many barriers to international capital mobility and trade in financial services and, in so 
doing, shifted greater economic control to private rather than public institutions. The 
resulting volatility of foreign-exchange markets generated demand for a variety of risk 
management products and fuelled innovation in a plethora of derivative instruments that 
later became vehicles for speculation (Lee and LiPuma, 2004). One important 
geography behind the events of 2008 was the competition between financial institutions 
in New York and London (French et al. 2009), both epicentres of the development of a 
largely unregulated ‘shadow’ banking systemiv trading in securitised forms of credit 
provision. These two financial centres exemplify the growing significance of finance in 
the US and UK economic imaginary over a period when both economies failed to 
generate broadly-based manufacturing growth and instead became increasingly 
dependent on debt-financed consumer demand (Gowan, 2009; Buchanan et al., 2009; 
Perrons, 2012) and the repatriation of the proceeds of the overseas expansion of their 
financial economies to fuel economic growth (Christophers 2012).   This model of 
growth was facilitated by low interest rate regimes fuelled by China’s trade surplus and 
willingness to, in effect, transfer parts of its surplus into the US fiscal deficit (Wolf, 
2008).   
With the erosion of Keynesian capital controls, nation states are no longer 
‘bulwarks against the global intrusions’ (Rai, 2004: 585) of capitalism but rather 
mediators tasked with adjusting national economies to the requirements of a variegated 
international capitalism (Peck and Theodore 2007). This has not meant the end of 
imperial power, but rather new forms of such power. Financial turbulence, 
“whether threatened or real, exercises an undeniable political leverage. It enables 
international financial institutions to force through the privatization of state 
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industries, welfare and infrastructure and to further impose forms of debt 
financing (securitized debt and short-term loans, for example), that are most 
volatile and most profitable to the institutional investment funds” (Cooper 2010: 
168). 
All of this is, of course, old news for parts of Latin America, Asia and Africa 
that have long been on the receiving end of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
through which ‘neoliberalization was imposed at the gunpoint of debt’ (Fraser, 2009: 
107; see also Pearson, 2000). In the wake of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, it was 
assumed that the classic markers of trouble – asset price bubbles and excess leverage – 
were confined to parts of the global South and thus the crisis did not unsettle faith in 
what Alan Greenspan labelled ‘the new advanced technology-based international 
financial system’ (Best, 2010: 29). Moreover, the Asian crisis could be attributed to 
‘crony capitalism’ (see for discussion Kelly et al., 2001), an explanation ‘fissured with 
orientalist reminders of the Asian way’ (Marshall, 2009: 423).  This happened despite 
the fact that the economies worst affected by the crisis - Thailand, Indonesia and Korea 
- had succumbed to international pressure from the IMF, OECD and others to liberalise 
their capital accounts (Wade and Veneroso 1998)
v
 while others who did not, notably 
India and China, avoided the worst of the crisis (see Singh 2007; Rodrik 2010). 
What is different about the sub-prime crisis is that it has brought to the US, ‘the 
kind of precipitous decline in liquidity, credit and employment that, in recent history, 
was seen only in emerging market crises’ (Johnson 2009, cited in Cooper 2010). 
Moreover, sovereign debt crises in Iceland, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy 
(with markets nervously watching the size of deficits in the US and UK) and austerity 
budgets elsewhere in Europe signal that this crisis is being felt in the heartlands of 
financialized capitalism. Many constituencies in the North with little or no experience 
 9 
(or memory) of poverty, mass unemployment, normalised precarity or the need for 
trades unions, are now facing unprecedented economic insecurity.  
 
A II A feminist political economy of financial crises: Déjà vu all over again?
vi
 
Diverse feminist literatures have long critiqued the gender-blindness of economic 
theories with their preferences for describing technical, abstract economic processes that 
produce a ‘narrative of eviction’ (Sassen 1998: 82) that displaces competing narratives 
of economic life (see also Nagar et al., 2002). Feminists have exposed the gendered 
models, methods, assumptions and practices that constitute globalising neoliberalism 
and its analytical home in neoclassical theory (see, for example, Ferber and Nelson, 
1993; Bakker 1994; Zein-Elabdin and Charusheela, 2004; Nagar et al., 2002; Beneria, 
1995). Different bodies of feminist scholarship have been at the forefront of heterodox 
critiques of the individualistic ‘separate self’ assumptions behind neoclassical micro-
economics which portray human beings as autonomous and impervious to social 
influences (Beneria 1995, England 1993). In similar vein, feminist scholarship has 
problematised the conception of individuals, norms and trust implicit in, for example, 
social capital theory (Maclean, 2010; Rankin, 2002; Molyneux, 2002).   
Second and related, feminist work has illustrated the gendered policy outcomes 
that flow from gender-blind theorising. Particularly significant here have been feminist 
critiques of neoclassical growth and macroeconomic adjustment policy. Elson and 
Çağatay (2000:1355) argue that macroeconomic policy often betrays three biases, all 
with harmful implications for women. A ‘deflationary bias’ privileges policy designed 
to maintain international financial credibility at the expense of dealing effectively with 
recession. A ‘male breadwinner bias’ assumes a norm “of full-time, life-long working-
age participation in the market-based labor market”, while a ‘commodification bias’ 
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privileges marketised, commodified provision of services (with attendant reduction in 
public provision). Feminist research has been especially critical of the World Bank’s 
SAPs introduced into many countries in the global South through the 1980s (see Elson 
1992, 1993, 1995), laying bare their uneven outcomes and their implicit, normalised, 
gendered assumptions. As Elson (1993:241) demonstrated, macroeconomic policies 
have often assumed an elastic endurance on the part of those affected such that,  
“the hidden ‘equilibrating factor’ is women’s ability to absorb the shocks of 
stabilization programmes, through more work and ‘making do’ on limited 
incomes”.  
Third, and by way of critique of both neoclassical and Keynesian theorising that 
assume that the private sector ‘produces’, the state sector ‘redistributes’ and the 
household ‘consumes’ (Elson 2007), feminist scholarship has long struggled to establish 
gender as an analytical category in macroeconomics and, crucially, to argue for a 
conception of the economy where the mutually constitutive links between private, state 
and household outputs become visible. Such work has taken various forms including 
producing gender auditing of national accounts, broadening definitions of 
‘economically active’ to include unpaid production and measuring the value of unpaid 
domestic labour in national income statistics (Çağatay et al., 1995; Elson, 1994; 
Beneria, 1995). Politically, such a move highlights how the household sector can have 
far reaching repercussions for the private and state sectors; witness concerns about 
young people’s educational underachievement and unemployment and standards of 
parenting (Elson 2007). Finally, and pulling together some of these threads, different 
groups of feminists have interrogated the contours of, 
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“a more humane economics centred around the provisioning of human needs 
rather than around the notions of scarcity, efficiency and maximization of 
economic growth without a human purpose” (Beneria 1995: 1847). 
Taken together, such work has moved well beyond the ‘add women and stir’ 
approach that simply charts gender outcomes to instead locate ideologies and practices 
of gender as constitutive of the complex, but nevertheless patterned (McCall, 2005), 
webs of relations that produce markets, households and consumers. Feminist 
scholarship has problematized the boundaries and meanings of ‘private and public, 
domestic and international, local and global’ (Marchand and Runyan, 2000: 18) and 
produced much fuller, grounded accounts of ‘economy’ that resist separation of formal 
and informal, paid and the unpaid, productive and the reproductive (Nagar et al. 2002).  
This scholarship is significant in the context of the recent financial crisis 
because it has demonstrated how conceptions of the economy, economic accounting and 
the economic and social outcomes of policy are shaped by explicit and implicit 
ideologies and practices of gender. Research in parts of the global South has 
demonstrated that women – for all their class, ethnic and other diversity – are 
disproportionately affected by financial crises and that the macroeconomic patterns of 
inequality alluded to above are gendered. There are several points – interior to this 
general argument - to be teased out here.    
First, and most straightforward to document, is the issue of job losses. While 
gender-disaggregated data is at best patchy and in many cases non-existent in parts of 
the global South, women are disproportionately concentrated in export manufacturing 
sectors and in other forms of marginal, insecure employment that are especially 
vulnerable to macroeconomic downturns (see Walby 2009). During the Asian financial 
crisis, for example, women were laid off at seven times the rate of men in South Korea 
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in 1998-99 (Singh and Zammit, 2002) and also bore the brunt of layoffs in Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia (Ghosh, 2010; Chibber et al., 2009). Although the recent crisis 
was felt first in parts of the North, declines in demand for manufactured goods and 
falling global industrial output, tourist expenditures, flows of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and remittances have contributed to increasing unemployment rates across parts 
of Asia and Latin America (most especially in Singapore, Taiwan and Mexico)(Sen, 
2011) and gendered patterns of job loss in Peru (Arguello, 2010) and Thailand 
(Seguino, 2010). This pattern has been uneven, however, with economies like Brasil 
weathering the crisis relatively well, courtesy of relatively low levels of consumer debt, 
strong prudential regulation of the banks and President Rousseff’s continuation of 
Lula’s poverty eradication programmes (see de Barros 2010).  
In parts of the North too, the repercussions of the crisis vary markedly between 
countries and regions, depending on their industrial and occupational distributions and 
social safety nets. In Greece, over a quarter of women are now unemployed (Davies 
2012). It was on the basis of prevailing patterns of gendered occupational segregation 
that some commentators suggested that the UK was facing its ‘first fully feminized 
recession’ (Sutherland 2009:1) because job losses were expected to be concentrated in 
retail and services sectors (see for example Dawley et al. 2012). In the early years of the 
recession, data suggest that men bore the brunt of job losses in the US and UK and 
across other parts of Europe because it was male-dominated sectors of finance, 
construction and durable goods manufacturing sectors that suffered the steepest falls in 
demand (Dϋtting, 2009; Runyan and Marchand, 2010; Seguino, 2010; Martin, 2010).  
The regional pattern of such job losses has been revealing. Erturk et al. (2011) report 
that 85 % of UK job losses between 2007 and 2010 (over 620,000 jobs) were 
concentrated in the West Midlands and North, areas still scarred by job losses in 
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previous rounds of restructuring that eroded the UK’s manufacturing base. London – 
one of the epicentres of the crisis - was the only region recording a net increase of jobs 
(Erturk et al., 2011). Given such a pattern of job losses, some commentators have 
argued that parts of the global North are experiencing a ‘man-cession’ or what Michigan 
economist Mark Perry described as ‘a downturn for women, a catastrophe for men’ 
(cited in Sommers, 2009). In the UK, although an estimated 143000 public sector jobs 
have been shed since June 2010 (Butler, 2011b), the full (and gendered) effects of 
public sector job losses have still to be felt. Public sector and what Buchanan et al. 
(2009) term ‘para-state’ jobs (publicly funded but privately employed workers in, for 
example, social care, nursery education and so forth) accounted for over half of all the 
UK’s employment growth between 1998 and 2008; in struggling regions like the West 
Midlands, public/para-state jobs were the only source of job growth as private sector 
employment shrank (Erturk et al. 2011).  
Second, in addition to the vulnerability associated with women’s occupational 
segregation, research also demonstrates that women also face labour market 
vulnerability because of gendered norms that view men as more ‘legitimate’ job holders 
when jobs are scarce (Seguino 2010, Ghosh 2010). Employers also react to deteriorating 
economic conditions – or use the cover of financial crisis – to reduce wages and/or 
hours, cut or delay the payment of bonuses, reduce other benefits or relocate and re-
open factories with a migrant labour force less knowledgeable about their rights 
(Pollock and Lin Aung, 2010). Moreover, official statistics and qualitative research 
alike will likely underestimate employment impacts on women, courtesy of women’s 
underemployment, declining hours, use of more part-time work or withdrawal from the 
labour market in response to joblessness (Seguino 2010) and child care commitments.  
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Third, feminists’ problematisation of the paid/unpaid and 
productive/reproductive binary also pushes us to look behind headline figures about job 
losses to interrogate the wider, lagged effects of financial crises.  To do this, we need to 
consider men and women not only as paid workers but also as unpaid workers, members 
of households and as citizens and individuals (Ghosh 2010:382). Women working in so-
called informal work, or in home-based enterprises or in piece rate work – low paid and 
usually lacking any non-wage benefits – are especially vulnerable to economic 
downturns. For these women, research has demonstrated how their conditions of work 
are intricately tied up with the provision of basic physical and social infrastructure, for 
example access to clean water, fuel, health and education services. As Diane Elson’s 
(1995) work demonstrated, it is the labour of social reproduction that typically forms a 
buffer in times of crisis, as households take on additional work to substitute services 
they can no longer afford to buy and/or the state no longer provides.  
Fourth, financial crises often become fiscal crises of states. This is due not only 
to the direct costs of bail outs for financial institutions and/or other firms, but also the 
indirect effects of declining profitability, spending and tax revenues (Seguino, 2010, 
Ghosh 2010).  As austerity cuts are introduced to cover budget deficits, the withdrawal 
of public services further intensifies pressures on households, with deeply gendered 
implications. Feminist scholarship has produced a wealth of research on how the 
privatisation of social reproduction and the deterioration of infrastructure have 
differentially affected groups of men, women and children (Beneria, 1995; Elson, 2002; 
Elson, 1994). Moser (2009), for example, documented – through 26 years of research in 
Guayaquil - how a deteriorating macroeconomic context translated into women 
extending their working day, children taking on additional responsibilities, depression, 
substance abuse and gender-based violence.  
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In the UK and US contexts, recent data suggests it is now middle aged women 
who are bearing the brunt of job losses (McVeigh and Helm 2012, Rushe 2012). In the 
UK, 50-64 year old women have experienced a 39 per cent increase in unemployment 
(compared with an overall rise of 5% among over-16s) in the two years up to February 
2012, while also facing attacks on their pensions and the demands of children, 
grandchildren and elderly relatives (McVeigh and Helm 2012). Beyond the gendered 
effects of public sector job losses in health, education and local government, there are 
tax and benefit changes to consider. The UK’s emergency budget in 2010 outlined £84 
billion of spending cuts up to 2015, with women bearing a disproportionate burden (an 
estimated 72% of £8.1bn) of personal tax increases and benefit cuts. Lone parents (92% 
of the UK’s lone parents are women) will lose an estimated 8.5% of their income by 
2015 due to changes in tax credits; this is three times the percentage loss for the average 
childless couple and more than any other group (Butler, 2011a). Reductions in 
corporation tax from April 2011 are similarly gendered in that the ‘beneficiaries will the 
owners, shareholders and senior managers of corporations’ (WBG 2011: 8). The budget 
was subject to legal challenge by the Fawcett Society
vii
 who argued that the government 
had not fulfilled their legal obligation (under the 2010 Equality Act) to undertake a 
gender equality assessment (Campbell 2010, WBG 2011) and that the budget would roll 
back a generation’s worth of progress towards economic equality for women. 
More broadly, the budget marked a continuation of the Coalition (and previous 
New Labour and Conservative) adoption of neoliberal governmentality, outlined in 
section I, with its policy of eroding the redistributive elements of social welfare policy 
and, instead, opting for an asset based welfare policy. This involves, “the reconstitution 
of subjectivities of welfare recipients” with a move away from, 
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“the passive receipt of state provided welfare services and towards active 
management of assets through which individuals become personally responsible 
for releasing future income streams when welfare needs demand they do so” 
(Watson, 2009: 42).  
For those able to invest, government policy is dedicated to improving their ‘financial 
literacy’ (Financial Services Authority, 2006) and financial and lifestyle media 
encourage individuals to re-imagine themselves as savvy, responsible investor subjects 
(Langley, 2006: 919). For those without the resources to invest, there is the increasingly 
threadbare residue of state provision in pensions, housing, health and social care. As 
Watson (2009) observes, there is an egalitarian agenda in such shifts, but one about 
equality of opportunity (to save and invest) rather than equality of outcome. The 
gendered implications of such shifts and differential access to asset ownership require 
much more research. 
Behind this withdrawal of the state is a familiar theme for feminists, namely 
displacing responsibility and hoping that forms of unpaid community, household or 
individual care-work will take up the slack. So, for example, underpinning the UK 
Coalition Government’s advocacy of what they term ‘the Big Society’, is the ideology 
that,   
“We in [central] government need to focus on doing the things that only 
government can do….what we need to facilitate is that – at the most local, most 
individual level – people both identify and solve problems in the way that they 
wish to solve them” Dame Helen Ghosh, Home Office Permanent Secretary 
(http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=Big-Society). 
The ‘Big Society’ is supposed to be populated with community groups, activists and 
volunteers who will step into local affairs to solve problems as and when they see fit. 
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Larner and Craig (2005), writing about the new ‘partnership ethos’ and 
professionalization of community activists in New Zealand, observe that it is often 
women who take on key community roles as ‘social entrepreneurs’. While such roles, 
could be empowering, their gendering ‘raises suspicions’ that women are adding a ‘third 
shift’ of governance work to their usual double shift of professional and domestic labour 
(Larner and Craig, 2005: 25-26).  
In various ways then, different groups of women ‘stand where many of these 
savage lines intersect’ as the state reduces the resources allocated to children and ‘the 
general “labour” of care and love’ (Hall, 2011, n.p). Ghosh (2010:384) has written 
about ‘the girl child’ whose access to education, food, and medical care is being reduced 
in many parts of the world as rising food prices and charges for public services 
encourage her withdrawal from school to help with other household tasks (see Pollock 
and Lin Aung 2010). Arguello (2010) draws on work at The Women’s Federation of Ica 
(FEPROMU) in Peru’s Ica Valley, a centre of agribusiness - to document how growing 
financial pressures are forcing eldest boys and girls to migrate to Lima in search of 
work and generating more trafficking and prostitution.  These pressures confront only 
those children who survive into adolescence. On that score, Alberdi (2009) notes the 
gender-bias in the rising infant mortality that accompanies financial crisis. She cites a 
World Bank policy brief that shows that a one or more unit fall in GDP increases 
average infant mortality in the ratio of 7.4 deaths per 1,000 births for girls and 1.5 
deaths per 1,000 births for boys (see also Buvinic 2009). 
Finally, and relevant in the context of calls for more complex geographical 
analyses of financialisation (Pike and Pollard 2010; Christophers 2012; French et al. 
2011), it is important to note that feminist scholarship - particularly that focused on 
parts of the South -  has long drawn attention to patterns of macroeconomic unevenness 
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and inequalities, and their intricate relational geographies, that constitute financial 
globalisation and growing incomes for some and financial crises for others (see Hart 
2002; Mohanty 2003; Wright 2006). Global – and gendered - inequalities were central 
to the formation of the 2008 crisis (Seguino 2009, Perrons 2012) and testify to the need 
to interrogate the dynamic interdependences of what Christophers (2012:287) terms 
“financialisation’s geographical ‘other’”. International flows of money, people and 
commodities have become much more complex – and less nation state centric - since 
the demise of Bretton Woods and the macroeconomic, regional and local financial 
wiring of such flows is changing. Through the post-war period, the US enjoyed the 
singular privilege of being able to displace adjustment costs to its trading partners by 
devaluing its currency and exporting the inflationary consequences around the globe 
(Evans, 1985). Recent criticisms of the US’s quantitative easing (Evans-Pritchard, 
2009) and talk of ‘currency wars’, however, signal growing international tensions as the 
US pursues this strategy to try to stimulate domestic growth. Meanwhile Chinese 
patterns of investment and migration are now reshaping development in parts of Africa 
(Silvey and Rankin 2011) and challenging “the old imperial credit-debt relationships 
between the Atlantic world and the South” (Gowan 2009:28). In terms of flows of 
people, economic migration and forced migration have long been key elements of 
restructuring in poorer regions and nations.  Feminist inspired and informed scholarship 
has helped make visible some of the gendered, racialised and class dynamics of such 
flows, be it the international “maid trade”, sex trafficking and tourism or the waves of 
migrant and immigrant women providing cleaning and catering services in global cities 
(see Mohanty 2003; Wills et al. 2010; Datta 2012). Such flows not only illustrate some 
of the complexity of global interconnections, but also add weight to the body of work 
that suggests that financial crises, 
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“tend to deliver the most harm to those who had usually gained the least from 
the preceding boom, by reducing wages and chances of employment, destroying 
livelihoods and constraining public provision of essential goods and services 
(Ghosh 2010:382)”. 
 
A III Gendering capital: an agenda for research 
Thus far I have used long-standing feminist concerns to highlight some of the likely 
gendered consequences of the recent financial crisis. In what follows, I extend this 
discussion to consider how more recent feminist and postcolonial insights could inform 
economic geographies of the recent financial crisis, focusing particularly on the sites 
and agents of economic-geographical research.  
 
B1 The sites of economic geographical research 
One of the major contributions of feminist scholarship on economic development is an 
insistence on moving beyond the formal spaces of waged work in the factory or the 
office to recognise other sites (the household, the street, the kitchen, the church and so 
forth) that subsidise, constitute and express ‘global capitalism’. Relatedly, feminist 
scholarship has extended Marxian understandings of social reproduction and its role in 
perpetuating class structures to include, 
“that broad range of practices and social relations that maintain and reproduce 
particular relations of production along with the material social grounds in 
which they take place. It is as much about the fleshy, messy indeterminate stuff 
of everyday life as it is a set of structural practices that unfold in dialectical 
relation to production, with which it is mutually constitutive and in 
tension”(Katz, 2004: x-xi).  
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Feminists have drawn attention to the economic significance of everyday practices of 
informal production, caring, love and reciprocity (Rankin, 2004; Nagar et al., 2002; 
Perrons, 2012). Relatedly, other work on globalization – often ethnographic in nature - 
has explored multi-scalar, multi-sited flows of money, people and knowledge that 
produce ‘global capitalism’ and the gendered metaphors of globalisation that privilege 
some (masculinised) actors over (feminised) others: market over state, global over local, 
finance over manufacturing, consumers over citizens (Marchand and Runyon 2000; 
Freeman, 2001; Nagar et al., 2002; Gibson-Graham, 1996; Bergeron, 2001, Hart 2002). 
Such international and comparative work has also been important in exploring the 
serendipity of how ideas and practices travel and in challenging how elite visions of 
change become hegemonic (Larner and Laurie, 2010). 
How might such concerns inform a broader research agenda around 
financialization and financial crises? The first insight concerns an extension of the sites 
and spaces of economic geographical analyses of money. Bryan et al. (2009:461), for 
example, have argued that financialization involves, ‘the direct incursion of capitalist 
calculation inside the household’, an observation which takes us to some very familiar 
feminist terrain concerning the relationship between the household and capitalist social 
relations and the need to recognise the diversity of households. This emphasis on the 
household is not new: households and the sphere of social reproduction have long been 
exposed to international financial networks. In the build up to the recent crisis, for 
example, many households in the US participated for the first time in mortgage markets 
as financial institutions devised new products and metrics to define and target ‘sub-
prime’ consumers. Moreover, middle class households have long held mortgage and 
insurance products or employed cleaners or nannies and bound their purchasing power 
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into the everyday geographies of (usually) working class and migrant women from 
different parts of the globe.  
While the emphasis on the household is not new, the recent bout of 
financialization and financial crisis does suggest a widening reach and intensification of 
financial connections into households that raises some significant questions about class, 
gender and social reproduction. The domestic labour debates of the 1970s critiqued 
Marx’s narrow definition of the value of labour power because it ignored the role of 
unpaid domestic labour in lowering the costs of reproducing labour power (see, for 
example, Himmelweit and Mohun, 1977; Molyneux, 1979). Bryan et al. (2009) argue 
that many households in the global North (including those in parts of East and Central 
Europe, see Stenning et al., 2010) are, increasingly, being exposed to the credit system 
not simply to cope with emergencies, but in order to consume the basics of everyday 
life.   
For Bryan et al. (2009), this ‘financialization of daily life’ means that labour is 
being reconstituted as a form of capital, with three implications. First, the reproduction 
of labour power itself becomes a source of surplus value in the form of interest 
payments as households pay their mortgages and other loans. If SAPs in the global 
South entailed a displacement of the costs of neoliberal restructuring to households, this 
recent financialization of daily life marks, ‘the monetization and appropriation of the 
surplus produced by unpaid domestic labor’ (Bryan et al. 2009: 464). Second, labour is, 
after Marx (1967), not only ‘doubly free’ in the labour market – in that workers are both 
separated from the means of production and ‘free’ to sell their labour power - but now 
they have this same ‘freedom’ in financial markets. Workers can now either seek to 
accumulate savings or convert part of their income into surplus value in the form of 
interest payments. Third, Bryan et al. (2009) argue that, like capital, labour is starting to 
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have its cost of being determined by the rate of interest; households must now 
determine how much of their income is required to service debt and what of the 
remainder can be used for consumption. In the words of the IMF (2005, cited in Bryan 
et al. 2009:468),  
“Overall, there has been a transfer of financial risk over a number of years, away 
from the banking sector to nonbanking sectors….This dispersion of risk has 
made the financial system more resilient, not the least because the household 
sector is acting more as a “shock absorber of the last resort””. 
This analysis of how financial networks can regulate everyday life and extract 
surpluses from parts of life (the reproduction of labour) and sites of life (the household) 
once held to be beyond the direct reach of capitalist financial calculation raises a host of 
questions about the constitution and expression of such logics and practices.  As 
feminists have long argued, households are major nodes in power relations of gender, 
class and generation and as such they should be a key site from which to explore 
financial geographies of everyday life and practice. One set of questions concern how 
the widening and deepening of financial logics into households shapes such power 
relations and financial divisions of labour within households (see Zelizer 1989). As 
Bryan et al. (2009) note, there are limits to the reconstitution of labour-as-capital; 
labour does not have the same ability to trade financial risks in the way that banks do 
and nor can they shield behind limited liability to ring fence any losses. For advocates 
of financialization like Robert Shiller (2003), one ‘solution’ is yet further 
financialization in the form of ‘livelihood insurance’. Another ‘solution’ is to work 
longer hours and for other unpaid forms of labour to try and take up the slack.  In 
countries like the UK, the gender wage gap has been decreasing, thanks largely to 
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growing inequalities across social class and especially the relative decline in earnings 
for lower paid men (Perrons 2012).  
Another ‘solution’ to this bout of financialization is to try and ride asset price 
inflation as, for example, ‘the home’ becomes not only a place to live but also a 
speculative asset designed to produce a second income or a pension (Smith et al., 2006; 
Martin, 2010). Again, the gender and class implications of this are likely to be uneven. 
For some groups of women with access to credit, the capacity to invest and good 
fortune in timing market movements, financialization may be associated with 
empowerment, dignity and independence from traditional authority structures. For 
others, it may entail a triple or quadruple burden and greater insecurity. There is 
certainly an agenda here for interrogating what the financialization of households is 
doing to gender and class dynamics and inequalities, most especially at the lower end of 
the income spectrum. 
Another related line of related research here would explore what growing 
indebtedness and exposure to credit markets means for patterns of mobility and 
household size and structure, especially in an era when public provision of welfare is in 
decline. For example, and echoing earlier work on housing in Latin America (Gilbert 
1983,1985), can we expect to see the growth of more extended, inter-generational 
households in the North as families struggle to cope with the costs of social care, child 
care, housing and pensions? Moreover, and again related to the above, what does living 
with indebtedness and the interdependence that goes with it, do for gender (and other) 
relations in the household? Feminist legal scholars, for example, have long taken an 
interest in the practice of using the family home as security for debt and, specifically, as 
a device to transfer liability for a partner’s debts. What is known, in legal parlance, as 
‘sexually transmitted debt’ (Fehlberg, 1994) occupies the messy and shifting legal 
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terrain where purportedly ‘private’ spousal relationships (where a partner may consent 
or be coerced to act as a guarantor on a loan or hold a joint mortgage on a property used 
as security) clash with ‘public’ third party transactions (when a partner is unable to 
repay a loan). In similar vein, ‘the family business’ and ‘the home’ (as a place to live 
and a speculative asset) trample the ragged boundaries of public and private and require 
an expanded conception of the sites and subjects suitable for financial-geographical 
research. For all that is written about the ‘increasing dematerialisation’ of money 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 1997: 21) and the proliferation of complex instruments that 
generate new and often bewildering geographies of asset creation, circulation, and 
destruction, ‘the “material” of money, land and human relationships remains’ (Green 
and Lim, 2001: 104).  
The analytical significance of the household has long been accepted by feminist 
scholars who have noted not only its economic significance but also its connections into 
wider gender, class, generational and other processes. Nevertheless, if we accept that the 
recent bout of financialization is, in some places at least, extending, deepening and 
normalizing the reach of financial metrics and logics into households, then the 
household becomes an especially significant site for exploring financial geographies of 
everyday life. Specifically, it is a site from which we can interrogate how credit and 
debt are crafting new and different patterns of gender, class and generational 
interdependencies.  
 
B2: The agents of economic geographical research  
Related to the above, feminist scholarship not only encourages analysis of a wider 
variety of sites and practices that produce the economic, it also asserts the need to 
explore a diverse group of agents that produce ‘the economy’. The influence of 
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postcolonial scholarship makes its presence felt in various ways in these literatures, 
encouraging the recovery of ignored and lost voices of the marginalised, exposing the 
material effects of development discourses and interrogating the interweaving of 
gender, class, racial, nationalist and religious differences in geographically uneven 
development (Radcliffe 2005). Important contributions have historicized and situated 
the cultural, discursive and ideological construction of economic development and 
explored how gendered processes value and de-value particular kinds of work and 
workers (for example, see Bergeron, 2001; Waylen, 2006; Hooper, 2000; Laurie, 2005; 
Kothari, 2006). So, for example, Chang and Ling (2000:34) explore the constructed 
gendered subjectivities of ‘techno muscular capitalism’ (finance, trade and 
telecommunications) and ‘regimes of labour intimacy’ of Filipina domestic workers in 
Hong Kong and contrast the masculine traits of globalism, ‘high-tech mobility, 
autonomy, and challenging opportunities’ - ascribed to both male and female 
cosmopolitans - with the feminized subjects of regimes of intimacy, the men and 
women who work (or are incarcerated) in low-wage, sexually exploitative jobs.  
In the context of the recent crisis, analysis of gendered subjectivities is an 
important step in challenging the de-spatializing, de-historicizing and de-socializing 
discourse of ‘complexity’ that has accompanied the recent crisis (see Christophers 
2009). One analytical strategy is to undertake research that interrogates a wider range of 
agents, moving beyond financial elites and the usual confines of financial industries, 
centres and financial ‘experts’ to better understand how financial logics, metrics and 
practices and reconfiguring (or not) economic practices more widely. Another strategy 
is to explore the mundane, everyday circuits of social, cultural and educational capital 
that reproduce financial markets.  To this end Hall and Appleyard’s work (2009) on the 
education of financial professionals is making important contributions.  
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A further analytical task in the context of the recent crisis is to revisit the 
production and reproduction of gendered subjectivities and ask why and how some are 
able to persist in the face of crises while others become more tenuous or lose their 
political purchase. Langley’s (2006) work on financial subjectification has been 
particularly important in understanding how neoliberal financialization has called forth 
responsible, savvy investor subjects seeking to manage their asset based welfare needs 
as various states rein in their welfare provision. One possibility here is to interrogate 
some familiar gendered subjectivities of haute finance implicated in the crisis (see Hall 
2011), but do so in some different ways.  
In discussions of financial elites men are frequently cast as testosterone-fuelled, 
competitive and risk-seeking while women are often characterised as ‘emotional’ 
(Nussbaum, 1995), ‘risk averse’ (Powell and Ansic, 1997), passive and quiet 
(McDowell, 1997). While the embrace of ‘risk’ has long been viewed as integral to the 
performance of particular masculinities in international financial centres (McDowell 
and Court, 1994; McDowell, 2010), feminist scholarship problematizes women’s 
perceived ‘risk aversion’ and contextualises it in terms of social roles inside and beyond 
the household. Feminist and postcolonial tactics encourage us to consider what is 
produced and/or hidden by essentializing women as less ‘risk-seeking’ than men and 
also encourage scrutiny of the ruptures and contradictions that surface in different 
subjectivities. So, for example, what are we to make of the ‘risk-seeking’ credentials of 
bankers working in UK and US institutions deemed ‘too big to fail’ and able to privatize 
their gains and displace their losses to tax payers and ultimately households? Clark 
(2011) has illustrated the significance of organizational culture – and less so economic 
theory – in explaining risk taking behaviour amongst financial elites. This question is 
especially significant in the context of the recent crisis where many of the key regulators 
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and banking personnel implicated in the crisis, and castigated at the time for either their 
greed and/or incompetence, retain their hold on key government offices and financial 
institutions (see Crotty 2009).  
Furthermore, key institutional players – most notably banks - operate behind a 
shield of limited liability (Gowan, 2009) not available on an equal footing to the 
individuals and households now encouraged to embrace financialization (Watson 2009, 
Bryan et al. 2009). Wider still, how does the ideological and discursive disjuncture 
between competitive, neoliberal, ‘testosterone capitalism’ of high finance (McDowell 
2010) and the less fashionable socialised capitalism, that has quietly underpinned bank 
operations in the US and UK, get (re)produced and maintained? On this score 
Christophers (2011) has made a start by recovering some of the hidden political and 
cultural history of national accounting conventions that reveal the contingent, contested 
and shifting boundary of what activities and industries count as ‘productive’ (as 
opposed to ‘unproductive’) and how it is that UK banks have been represented as 
economically and politically untouchable. In the current political climate, debate about 
how much or how little re-regulation of financial markets is required to make them 
‘work more efficiently’ misses the point; what is needed is a more fundamental re-
politicization of the concept and definition of ‘financial risk’ (see de Goede, 2004).  
Finally, it is also worth exploring the formation of new gendered subjectivities 
and the geo-political economic moments when gendered subjectivities are being 
reconfigured and renegotiated for different ends. As Mohanty (2003) argues, we need to 
explore what and how new femininities are being produced in debates about 
financialization, in addition to the ubiquitous sex worker, teenage factory worker or 
domestic that populates globalization literatures. Although women are increasingly 
visible in professional occupational ranks in the UK, as investors they have often been 
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constructed as risk averse and steered to conservative ‘widows and orphans’ products 
by financial advisers (Ravenhall 1999). In other parts of the globe, however, a complex, 
uneven and at times contradictory intersection of gender politics, financialization and 
neoliberalism has also spawned the ‘woman-as-safe-pair-of-hands-cum-entrepreneurial-
subject’ that now populates literatures on microfinance (Leland, 2008; Rankin, 2002; 
Maclean, 2010; Elyachar, 2002; Fraser, 2009). The formation of different and shifting 
gendered subjectivities could mark some democratization of finance and some 
progressive possibilities for different groups of women. Yet it is sobering, as Rankin 
(2001) argues in the context of the development of micro-credit in Nepal, to 
contemplate why planners have suddenly discovered three decades of feminist research 
in agrarian economies in the global South that illustrates that women – across diverse 
national, cultural and demographic contexts - perform the bulk of productive labour, 
contribute relatively more of their income to household well-being than men, and have a 
higher propensity to repay their loans. Rankin concludes (2001:28) that for donors and 
lenders alike, women’s roles are marked as crucial for the sustainability of micro-credit 
programmes and,  
“ultimately contribute most effectively to the broader goals of deepening 
financial markets to areas that typically fall outside the purview of capitalist 
markets”.  
As the sub-prime crisis demonstrated, financializing capital is moving well beyond its 
previously middle class financial ecologies (French et al. 2011) to extend the tentacles 
and technologies of value extraction to new sites and populations.  Some of the poorest 
women around the globe are being reconstituted as entrepreneurial financial subjects as 
the shifting front lines of neoliberal and colonial rationalities deploy the language of 
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‘empowerment’, ‘gender equality’ and ‘development’ to extend and deepen the reach of 
financial markets (Rankin, 2002; Fraser, 2009; Roy, 2010).  
 
A IV Conclusions  
As Ron Martin (2010) has argued, the recent financial crisis is one that it is difficult to 
write about in temperate language. This is the case partly because so much of what has 
happened is so familiar, not least for those who have worked in parts of the global 
South. In this paper I have charted some contours of what the crisis means for the 
theoretical and empirical scope of economic geography, not only in the context of 
exploring financializing capitalism and its periodic crises, but more broadly, in how it 
conceives, sources and practices its analytical objectives. I have argued that the recent 
crisis is an opportunity for economic geographers to take stock of what they might learn 
from heterogeneous feminist analyses that have long interrogated financial crises and 
their repercussions. Such literatures, I have argued, provide two groups of resources for 
economic geographers.  
First there is a long-standing history of feminist work that has exposed the 
gendered models, methods, assumptions and practices that constitute globalizing 
neoliberalism. In so doing, feminists have championed holistic, grounded accounts of 
‘economy’ that resist attempts to separate the formal and informal, the paid and the 
unpaid, the productive and the reproductive (Nagar et al. 2002). This work is worth 
revisiting because it delivers some lessons about financial crises that have stood the test 
of time and bear repeating. One lesson is that the economic and social repercussions of 
financial crises are shaped by explicit and implicit ideologies and practices of gender. 
Another lesson is that crises tend to do the most damage to those at the bottom end of 
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the income distribution, by reducing employment, hours, wages and by placing limits on 
public provision of essential goods and services.  
Second, and related, I have argued that feminist and postcolonial literatures 
house resources that can help generate less partial economic-geographical 
understandings of financialization. Postcolonial literatures highlight the integral, 
mutually constitutive place of the South in western discourses of modernity and 
progress. Taking up Vira and James’ (2011) call to ‘head South’ is not only 
fundamental to understanding the macroeconomic context for the crisis, it also widens 
the empirical reach of financialization literatures (see Rethel, 2010), exposes some of 
the front lines of neoliberal and colonial financializing rationalities (Rankin, 2002; 
Fraser, 2009; Roy, 2010) and is a required element of any attempts to produce less 
anaemic geographies of financialization (Christophers 2012).  
Gendering capital requires reconsideration of some long standing – if long 
ignored or sidelined - feminist ideas about more inclusive analyses of economic growth, 
globalization and financial crises. Gendering capital builds from an understanding that 
macroeconomic aggregates like levels of expenditure, debt and GNP are ‘bearers of 
social relations and are imbued with social values’ (Elson and Çağatay 2000:1360) that 
are not immutable and need to be made visible.  For Mohanty (2003), feminist concerns 
for social justice should start from and be anchored in the experiences of the most 
marginal and poor and examples of some alternative measures of development have 
been devised in gender and development literatures (see Chant 2010; UNDP 2009; Sen 
2001). One pressing task is to revalue the work of social reproduction (Perrons 2012). 
Macroeconomic policies have social content that shapes patterns of inequality, 
educational attainment, poverty and mobility and, in turn, economic possibilities. Thus 
it is important to keep making the connections between economic policy and its social 
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outcomes that, across even the most affluent parts of the globe, the EU and North 
America, have resulted in increasing social inequalities since 1980, evidenced in 
labour’s falling share of productivity gains, growing earnings inequality, child poverty 
and in-work poverty (Perrons and Plomien 2010).  
Interior to this broad argument, a feminist informed agenda for research on 
financial geographies would take as read that the economic and financial are part of 
society and not somehow separate. Thus the analysis would ask how economic policy - 
and financial institutions - can produce and ameliorate poverty and inequality and not 
centre on how those defined as ‘poor’ and ‘high risk’ can be ‘brought inside’ and 
managed in financialized capitalism. In regulatory terms, such an agenda would involve 
greater regulatory control, more transparent accounting rules to oversee financial 
intermediation and banks’ balance books and regulators tasked to protect taxpayers and 
not only financial institutions. The analytical remit would also entail an expanded set of 
research sites moving beyond the usual suspects of financial institutions and financial 
centres to explore how financial metrics and practices are insinuated in parts of life (the 
reproduction of labour) and sites of life (the household) once held to be beyond the 
reach of capitalist financial calculation. It is important to explore how the securitization 
of mortgages, car loans, credit card debt, and other forms of debt are producing new and 
different forms of interdependence, mediated by gender, class and age. In turn, these 
more complex geographies of financialization can generate deeper understandings of the 
contexts in which financialization may not only be victimizing, but also liberating for 
some groups. The household is an increasingly important site for analysis of 
contemporary financialization, and questions concerning the development of, and limits 
to, financialized divisions of labour. How does an increasing reliance on asset price 
inflation shape future economic possibilities for households? How do such 
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developments affect the role of the state in local, regional and international 
development? And what are the emerging landscapes of democratisation, solidarity or 
vulnerability that accompany such shifts?  
Another part of an agenda is to revisit agency in the context of the recent crisis 
and to explore how feminist (and other) work on subjectivities can revisit some familiar 
subjects in different ways that helps to re-politicize understandings of financial markets. 
Feminist analyses push us to consider some different vantage points from which to 
assess risk, how it is defined and understood in different contexts and what it means to 
live (or nott) with its consequences. Feminist and postcolonial analyses interrogate the 
production and reproduction of gendered subjectivities and ask why and how some are 
able to persist in the face of crises while others become more tenuous or lose their 
political purchase. In a context where remarkably little has changed – in terms of 
regulation or personnel - since the crisis, it is important to interrogate such 
subjectivities. 
The sub-prime crisis should be used as an opportunity to ponder broader cultural 
and moral shifts in the nature of debt, risk, and expectations that are not only shaping 
and re-shaping patterns and forms of economic development, but are also bound up with 
normative questions about how and in whose interests finance should be organised 
(Brassett et al., 2010). The financialization of everyday life in part mirrors 
developments in other markets, in that numerous governments have used de-and re-
regulation to ‘liberalize’ labour markets. Yet in the sphere of labour markets – unlike 
finance - there has also been a significant critique developed and some attempts to 
ameliorate the worst excesses of the ‘Anglo-American’ model (Wills et al., 2009). 
Feminist scholarship, for all its theoretical, geographical, epistemological and 
methodological diversity – retains a ‘continuing commitment to progressive ideals of 
 33 
justice and ethics, democracy and equality’ (Nagar et al. 2002: 259). Rather than being 
dazzled by the apparent complexity of financialization, or reductionist and essentialist 
claims and counter-claims about its causes, feminist literatures can contribute to an 
economic geography better able to understand and form critical responses to recent 
developments.  
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i
 http://www.un.org.ga/econcrisissummit,last accessed 1 August 2011. 
ii
 More accurately, I should refer to feminisms, in recognition of the epistemological and methodological 
pluralism that marks feminist scholarship. 
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iii
 Financialization is a slippery, contested term (Lee et al. 2009), but is taken here to refer to “the 
increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions” (Epstein 
2005:3) in economic, political and cultural life. 
iv
 One feature of deregulation in the US and UK was the shift to the use of credit in the form of securities, 
rather than bank loans. This allowed banks and other non-depository institutions like hedge funds, private 
equity firms and Special Investment Vehicles to trade in assets ‘off balance sheet’ and – with no lender of 
the last resort – to insure these assets with derivatives which were then sold on (see Blackburn 2008). 
v
 A country’s capital account includes a range of short term (e.g. bank loans and portfolio investment 
(investment in equities)) and long(er) term financial flows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Neoclassical theory suggests that free capital flows promote more efficient allocation of capital and, in 
turn, introduce benefits in the form of growth, employment, and stable economic policy as ‘open’ 
economies become accountable to international financial markets, a view endorsed by institutions like the 
IMF  (see IMF 1998, Singh 2007). By imposing controls on capital account transactions by, for example, 
regulating firms’ overseas borrowing, governments can shape the forms of financial inflows and outflows 
they experience and, to a degree, insulate themselves from the volatility of international financial markets. 
vi
 Attributed to Yogi Berra, a Major League baseball player and coach in the United States 
(www.yogiberra.com/yogi-isms/html), accessed 15 June 2012. 
vii
 The Fawcett Society is a group that has, since 1866, been campaigning for gender equality in the UK 
http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/index.asp?PageID=4. 
 
 
 
